Worldwide Ballistic Missile Inventories

1. All missiles are surface-to-surface unless otherwise noted. SLBM is an acronym for a submarine-launched ballistic missile.

2. The ranges and payloads, given in kilometers (km) and kilograms (kg), respectively, are estimates based on unclassified sources. These figures, however, do not reflect either the missile’s maximum range or its heaviest payload. Equipping a missile with a lighter payload would increase its range. Similarly, a heavier payload would diminish a missile’s range.

3. Several states formerly part of or allied with the Soviet Union retain Soviet SS-21 and Scud missiles. Additionally, according to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), continued Russian, Chinese, and North Korean technological and material support remains critical to further development of other foreign missile programs, particularly those of Iran and Pakistan. In its latest version of an annual proliferation report (covering 2004), the CIA noted that ballistic missile assistance from “entities in China, North Korea, and Russia over the years has helped Iran move toward its goal of becoming self-sufficient in the production of ballistic missiles.” In 2004, China announced its interest in joining the voluntary Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) but so far has been denied membership because some existing members, including the United States, remain concerned about Chinese missile proliferation.

4. A January 15, 2001 report by the UN Monitoring Group on Afghanistan concluded that prior to the October 2001 U.S.-led offensive in Afghanistan there were approximately 100 Scud-B missiles and at least four Scud mobile launchers in Afghanistan. The current distribution and operational capability of the missiles are unknown, although the UN Monitoring Group speculated that up to 30 of the missiles might be under control of the Northern Alliance.

5. According to a 1997 report by Lev Rokhlin, then-Chairman of the Russian State Duma’s Committee on Defense, Russia transferred eight Scud-B ballistic missiles and 24 Scud launchers, along with other military hardware, to Armenia between 1993-1996. Responding to publication of the report in the Russian newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta and to formal requests by the Azerbaijan government, then-Russian President Boris Yeltsin ordered an investigation into the claims. They were subsequently confirmed in April 1997 by Aman Tuleyev, then-Russian minister for relations with the Commonwealth of Independent States.

6. In the Department of Defense’s 2007 report on Chinese military power, the DF-31 ICBM is listed as having “initial threat capability,” meaning it “could be employed in actual military operations” even though it is not yet officially deployed.

7. India and Pakistan claim that their missiles are not deployed, meaning that the missiles are not on launchers, aimed at particular locations, or kept on a high state of alert. The missiles are in a state of “induction” with the nuclear warheads stored in facilities separate from the missile units and airfields. Pakistan and India, however, have deployed their missiles on a number of occasions, such as the Kargil crisis in July 1999.

8. The Agni-3’s first flight test failed on July 9, 2006. The missile dropped into the sea after five minutes of flight. The Indian government declared the missile’s second flight test on April 12, 2007 a success.

9. A great deal of speculation has surrounded Iran’s missile program concerning the possible development of a longer-ranged Shahab-4 and a rumored Shahab-5, supposedly based on the Russian SS-4 and the North Korean Taepo Dong-1, respectively. Iran has denied this assertion, claiming that it has “no plans to develop long-range missiles…since the U.S. is not one of Iran’s strategic defense targets.” A 2005 Congressional Research Service report suggests that perhaps Iran is developing longer-range missiles under the less politically-precarious title of an “improved” or “upgraded” Shahab-3. There also is speculation that Iran has imported a North Korean missile modeled on the Soviet SS-N-6 SLBM. (See endnote 14.)

10. Because of lack of current documentary evidence and inconsistencies in source reporting, the status of Iraq’s ballistic missile arsenal is unclear. The United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) determined in 2003 that the Al Samoud II and the Al Fat’h missiles exceeded the range permitted under UN Security Council Resolution 687. That resolution prohibited Iraq from possessing missiles with ranges exceeding 150 kilometers. UN inspectors began the destruction of these missiles on March 1, 2003, but the inspectors were withdrawn before all of the missiles had been eliminated. According to UNMOVIC’s 13th Quarterly Report, only two-thirds of the Al Samoud II missiles declared by Iraq had been destroyed. The 2004 Iraq Survey Group Report by the United States asserted that a “full accounting of the Al Fat’h missiles may not be possible.”

11. According to a CIA Report, Libya privately pledged to the United States in 2003 that it would eliminate all missiles classified as Category I systems by the MTCR. Category I pertains to missiles capable of traveling 300 kilometers or more with a payload of at least 500 kilograms, the presumed minimum weight for a first-generation nuclear warhead. Libya, however, still maintains a missile development program for systems that fall below the Category I threshold capability.

12. The Taepo Dong-I was first flight-tested August 31, 1998. Its first two stages worked but a third stage failed. The missile has not been flight-tested again.

13. The Taepo Dong-II failed about 40 seconds into its inaugural flight test on July 5, 2006. It has not been flight-tested again.

14. Although North Korea has never flight-tested the SS-N-6 variant, Washington alleges that Pyongyang has deployed the missile. The SS-N-6 originally was a Soviet submarine-launched ballistic missile, but North Korea is reportedly deploying it as a road-mobile missile. There also is speculation that North Korea has transferred this missile to Iran. (See Paul Kerr, “Iran, North Korea Deepen Missile Cooperation,” Arms Control Today, January/February 2007, p. 38.)

15. The SS-27 (Topol-M/RS-12M) is deployed in both road-mobile and silo-based configurations.

16. On December 9, 2002, Spanish forces intercepted a North Korean cargo ship bearing 15 Scud missiles to Yemen. The United States intervened to permit the transfer to be completed because Yemen is considered an important ally in the U.S.-led “War on Terror.” Yemen pledged to cease further arms purchases from North Korea.

Sources: Arms Control Association; Missile Defense Agency; U.S. Department of Defense; Andrew Feickert, Missile Survey: Ballistic and Cruise Missiles of Selected Foreign Countries, Congressional Research Service, July 26, 2005, 39 pp;National Air and Space Intelligence Center, Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, March 2006, 29 pp; Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January 2004-31 December 2004, 10 pp; and Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2007, May 25, 2007, 42 pp.

-Researched by Abby Doll