1. [The lemon problem]
A seller has a used car to sell and a buyer is interested in buying it. Suppose the value \( \theta \) of the car to seller is random and uniformly distributed on the interval \([0, 1]\). The seller knows \( \theta \), which can be thought of as the type of the seller. The buyer does not know \( \theta \) but it is assumed that the value of the car to the buyer is \( a + b\theta \), for some constants \( a \) and \( b \) such that \( a \geq 0 \) and \( 1 < a + b < 2 \). These constraints ensure that the car is worth more to the buyer than to the seller for any \( \theta \), so, payment aside, the socially optimal outcome would be for the car to be transferred from seller to buyer. But can they agree on a price? Suppose the seller, knowing \( \theta \), calculates a reserve price \( r = r(\theta) \), which is the minimum amount the seller would sell the car for. Suppose the buyer selects a price \( p \in [0, 1] \) and offers to pay \( p \) for the car. If \( p \geq r \), the car is sold for price \( p \). Otherwise the car is not sold. The payoff for the seller is
\[
u_s(p, r, \theta) = \theta 1_{\{p < r\}} + p 1_{\{p \geq r\}}\]
and the payoff for the buyer is
\[
u_b(p, r, \theta) = (a + b\theta - p) 1_{\{p \geq r\}}\].

(a) Identify a weakly dominant strategy for the seller.
(b) Assuming seller uses its weakly dominant strategy, find the price \( p \) the buyer should offer to maximize her/his expected payoff. (Suppose the buyer knows \( a, b \), and the distribution of \( \theta \)).
(c) What happens in the special case \( a = 0 \) and \( 1 < b < 2 \). Give a simple explanation.

2. [Trigger strategy with limited punishment]
The payoff matrix for the prisoners’ dilemma game is:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>1,1</td>
<td>-1,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>2, -1</td>
<td>0,0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Consider repeated play of the game with discount factor \( \delta \). Consider the following limited trigger strategy \( s_{T,k} \): Play \( C \) in the first stage. In the \( k \) stages following the first stage some player plays \( D \), play \( D \). Those \( k \) stages represent limited punishment. After those \( k \) stages reset the strategy and continue as from the beginning. Find the smallest value \( \delta_k \) in the interval \([0, 1]\) such that \((s_{T,k}, s_{T,k})\) is a subgame perfect equilibrium for all \( \delta \) with \( \delta \leq \delta < 1 \). Give numerical values for \( k = 1 \) and \( k = 2 \) and an equation to solve for \( k \geq 1 \). Justify your answer by appealing to the one step deviation principle.

3. [Shapley’s version of rock-scissors-paper game, revisited]
Consider Shapley’s version of the rock-scissors-paper game:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>R</th>
<th>S</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>0,0</td>
<td>1,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>0,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>1,0</td>
<td>0,1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. [VCG allocation of a divisible good]

Suppose one unit of a divisible good, such as wireless bandwidth or power output, is to be divided among \( n \) buyers. Suppose the value function of buyer \( i \) for quantity \( x_i \) is given by \( v_i(x_i) = w_i \ln x_i \), where \( w_i \) is private information to buyer \( i \) with \( w_i > 0 \). A VCG mechanism is used to determine the allocation \( x = (x_1, \ldots, x_n) \) (such that \( x_i \geq 0 \) with \( \sum_i x_i = 1 \)) and payments \((m_1, \ldots, m_n)\) as a function of the bids. To reduce the amount of communication required, each buyer \( i \) submits a single positive scaler bid \( b_i \), which the mechanism interprets as the value function \( \tilde{v}_i(x_i) = b_i \ln x_i \). State the allocation and payment rules in as simple a form as possible. To be definite, use the payment rule as described in remark 6.4(c) of the notes. (Hint: To double check your answer you could make sure the payoff of a buyer \( i \), i.e. \( w_i \ln x_i(b) - m_i(b) \), is maximized with respect to \( b_i \) by setting \( b_i \) equal to the true value \( w_i \).

5. [Reverse auction VCG mechanism]

Each day, a certain electric utility company purchases power production for the next day from a set of producers, such as nuclear power plants, coal fired power plants, or solar farms. Each producer \( i \) submits a bid, which is a function \( p_i(q_i) \) for various values of \( q_i \geq 0 \). For each value of \( q_i \), the bid \( p_i(q_i) \) is the reported cost for the producer to supply \( q_i \) units of power for the next day. Suppose the utility company requires a total production of power \( Q > 0 \). Given the bids \((p_i(\cdot))_{i \in I}\), the utility must decide the quantity of power \( q_i^* \) to be provided by the \( i^{th} \) producer and the amount \( m_i \) to be paid to the \( i^{th} \) producer, for each \( i \), such that \( \sum_i q_i^* = Q \). This is called a reverse auction because there is a single buyer, buying from many sellers. The allocation mechanism should be incentive compatible (IC), so the producers report their true cost of production, individually rational (IR), so the producers should pay no more than their bids, and welfare maximizing, so the power \( Q \) is produced with the least cost possible.

(a) Describe a VCG mechanism for this allocation problem. (Hint: There are two ways to approach this problem. One way is to map to the VCG framework and map back. The cost of production for producer \( i \) is the opposite of value, so the value of an allocation \((q_1, \ldots, q_n)\) for producer \( i \) as \( v_i(q_i) = -p_i(q_i) \). Similarly, the payments to the producers are equivalent to negative payments from the producers to the utility, so \( m_i(q) \) defined by \( m_i(q) = -p_i(q) \) could be thought of as the equivalent payment from the producer to the utility. The other way may is to use the basic VCG philosophy in this new context without mapping back and forth.)

(b) Consider an example with three producers and the following bids:

\[
p_1(q_1) = \begin{cases} 2q_1 & 0 \leq q_1 \leq 1 \\ 6q_1 - 4 & q_1 \geq 1 \end{cases}, \quad p_2(q_2) = 4q_2 \text{ for all } q_2 \geq 0, \text{ and } p_3(1) = 1 \text{ and } p_3(2) = 2.5.
\]
The technology of the third producer limits production to either 0, 1, or 2 units of power. Note that the total amount of power produced must be exactly $Q$. Describe the allocations $(q_1^*, q_2^*, q_3^*)$ and the payments to the three producers if the total quantity of power required is $Q = 1.5$, for the mechanism you gave in part (a). (Note: The payments may seem to be higher than reasonable.)

(c) Repeat part (b), with the same bids, for $Q = 3$. 

![Graphs of $p_1(q)$, $p_2(q)$, and $p_3(q)$]