1. (3 points) Prove that if $C$ is the set of cost functions of the form $c(x) = ax^2 + bx + c$ with $a, b, c \geq 0$, then the Pigou bound $\alpha(C)$ is $\frac{3\sqrt{3}}{3\sqrt{3} - 2}$.

2. (8 points) Consider an atomic selfish routing game in which all players have the same source vertex and sink vertex (and each controls one unit of flow). Assume that edge cost functions are non-decreasing, but do not assume that they are affine. Prove that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time. Be sure to discuss the issue of fractional vs. integral flows, and explain how (or if) you use the hypothesis that edge cost functions are non-decreasing.

[Hint: Recall the Rosenthal’s potential function. You can assume without proof that the minimum-cost flow can be solved in polynomial time. If you haven’t seen the min-cost flow problem before, you can read about it in any book on “combinatorial optimization”.]

3. (5 points) This problem develops some theory about potential games; we talked about these while discussing selfish routing. We consider an abstract finite game with $n$ players with finite strategy sets $S_1, \ldots, S_n$. Each player has a payoff function $\pi_i$ mapping outcomes (elements of $S_1 \times \cdots \times S_n$) to real numbers. Recall that a potential function for such a game is defined
by the following property: for every outcome $s \in S_1 \times \cdots \times S_n$, every player $i$, and every deviation $s'_i \in S_i$, 
$$\pi_i(s'_i, s_{-i}) - \pi_i(s_i, s_{-i}) = \Phi(s'_i, s_{-i}) - \Phi(s_i, s_{-i}).$$

A team game is a game in which all players have the same payoff function: $\pi_1(s) = \cdots = \pi_n(s)$ for every outcome $s$. In a dummy game, the payoff of every player $i$ is independent of its strategy: $\pi_i(s_i, s_{-i}) = \pi_i(s'_i, s_{-i})$ for every $s_{-i}$ and every $s_i, s'_i \in S_i$.

Prove that a game with payoffs $\pi_1, \ldots, \pi_n$ is a potential game (i.e., admits a potential function) if and only if it is the sum of a team game $\pi^t_1, \ldots, \pi^t_n$ and a dummy game $\pi^d_1, \ldots, \pi^d_n$ (i.e., $\pi_i(s) = \pi^t_i(s) + \pi^d_i(s)$ for every $i$ and $s$.)

4. (4 points) Show that in every network cost-sharing game, the PoA is at most $n$, where $n$ is the number of players.

5. (3 points) Consider an atomic selfish routing game with $m$ edges and cost functions taking values in $\{1, 2, \ldots, H\}$. Prove that best-response dynamics converges to a PNE in at most $mH$ iterations.

6. Consider $n$ identical machines and $m$ selfish jobs (the players). Each job $j$ has a processing time $p_j$. Once jobs have chosen machines, the jobs on each machine are processed serially from shortest to longest. (You can assume that the $p_j$’s are distinct.) For example, if jobs with processing times 1, 3, and 5 are scheduled on a common machine, then they will complete at times 1, 4, and 9, respectively. The following questions concern the game in which players choose machines in order to minimize their completion times. The objective function as a planner is to minimize the total completion time $\sum_{j=1}^{m} C_j$, where $C_j$ is the completion time job $j$.

   (a) (2 points) Define the rank $R_j$ of job $j$ in a schedule as the number of jobs on $j$’s machine with processing time at least $p_j$ (including $j$ itself). For example, if jobs with processing times 1, 3, and 5 are scheduled on a common machine, then they have ranks 3, 2, and 1, respectively.

   Prove that in these scheduling games, the objective function value of an outcome can also be written as $\sum_{j=1}^{m} p_j R_j$.

   (b) (2 points) Prove that the following algorithm produces an optimal outcome: (i) sort the jobs from largest to smallest; (ii) for $i = 1, 2, \ldots, m$, assign the $i^{th}$ job in this ordering to machine $i \mod n$ (where machine 0 means machine $n$).

   (c) (3 points) Prove that for every such scheduling game, the expected objective function value of every coarse correlated equilibrium is at most twice that of an optimal outcome.

   (Hint: The $(\lambda, \mu)$-smoothness condition (see notes provided) was required for all pairs $s^*, s$ of outcomes. Weaken the definition so that this condition only needs to hold for some optimal outcome $s^*$ and all outcomes $s$. Observe that PoA of coarse correlated equilibria remains at most $\frac{1}{1-\mu}$ assuming only this weaker condition (with the same proof as before). Prove that this scheduling game satisfies this weaker condition for $\lambda = 2$ and $\mu = 0$.)
The remaining problems are for self study. Do NOT submit for grading.

- Give example of a two-player game with pure NE, where best response dynamics can cycle.
- Give example of a potential game where the strategy profile achieving minimum potential does not give the minimum cost NE. [Hint: Try cost-sharing game.]
- Prove that if a game admits two potential functions \( \Phi_1 \) and \( \Phi_2 \), then \( \Phi_1 \) and \( \Phi_2 \) differ by a constant. That is, for some \( c \in \mathbb{R} \), \( \Phi_1(s) - \Phi_2(s) = c \) for every outcome \( s \) of the game. Thus, it is well defined to speak of “the potential function maximizer” of a potential game.
- Prove that a finite game admits a potential function if and only if for every two outcomes \( s^1 \) and \( s^2 \) that differ in two players’ choices, say players \( i \) and \( j \),

\[
(\pi_i(s_i^2, s_j^1) - \pi_i(s^1)) + (\pi_j(s^2) - \pi_j(s_i^2, s_j^1)) = (\pi_j(s_j^2, s_i^1) - \pi_j(s^1)) + (\pi_i(s^2) - \pi_i(s_j^2, s_i^1))
\]

- As we discussed in class, a congestion game is like an atomic selfish routing game except we drop the assumption that strategies represent paths in a network. That is, there is a ground set \( E \) (previously, the edges), and each \( e \in E \) has a cost function \( c_e \). Each player \( i \) has a strategy set \( S_i \), and each strategy \( s_i \in S_i \) is a subset of \( E \) (previously, a path). In an outcome \( s = (s_1, \ldots, s_n) \), if \( x_e \) players are using a strategy that contains \( e \), then player \( i \)'s cost is \( \sum_{e \in s_i} c_e(x_e) \). We showed in class that every congestion game is a potential game.

Next we prove the converse. Two games \( G_1 \) and \( G_2 \) are isomorphic if: (i) they have the same number \( k \) of players; (ii) for each \( i \), there is a bijection \( f_i \) from the strategies \( A_i \) of player \( i \) in \( G_1 \) to the strategies \( B_i \) of player \( i \) in \( G_2 \); and (iii) these bijections preserve payoffs, so that \( \pi_i^1(s_1, \ldots, s_n) = \pi_i^2(f_1(s_1), \ldots, f_n(s_n)) \) for every player \( i \) and outcome \( (s_1, \ldots, s_n) \) of \( G_1 \). (Here \( \pi^1 \) and \( \pi^2 \) are the payoff functions of \( G_1 \) and \( G_2 \) respectively).

(a) Prove that every team game (see Problem 5) is isomorphic to a congestion game.
(b) Prove that every dummy game (see Problem 5) is isomorphic to a congestion game.
(c) Prove that every potential game is isomorphic to a congestion game.

- The multiplicative weights algorithm requires advance knowledge of the time horizon \( T \) to set the parameter \( \eta \). Modify the algorithm so that it does not need to know \( T \) a priori. Your algorithm should have expected regret at most \( b\sqrt{(\ln n)/T} \) for all sufficiently large \( T \) and for every adversary, where \( b > 0 \) is a constant independent of \( n \) and \( T \).
- This problem concerns combinatorial auction where each bidder \( i \) has a unit-demand valuation \( v_i \). This means that there are value \( v_{i1}, \ldots, v_{im} \) such that \( v_i(S) = \max_{j \in S} v_{ij} \) for every subset \( S \) of items.

Consider a payoff-maximization game in which each bidder \( i \) submits one bid \( b_{ij} \) for each item \( j \) and easy item is sold separately using a second-price single-item auction. Assume that each
bid $b_{ij}$ lies between 0 and $v_{ij}$. The utility of a bidder is her value for the items won less her total payment. For example, if bidder $i$ has values $v_{i1}$ and $v_{i2}$ for two items, and wins both items when the second-highest bids are $p_1$ and $p_2$, then her utility is $\max\{v_{i1}, v_{i2}\} - (p_1 + p_2)$.

- Prove that the POA of PNE in such a game can be at most $\frac{1}{2}$.
- Prove that the POA of CCE in every such game is at least $\frac{1}{2}$. 
