Signatures

Lecture 23

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  - Relatively efficient ones under specific assumptions (often relatively strong/new assumptions)
- Definitions sometimes have subtleties (not all of them have ideal functionality specifications)

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- Security requirement: Unforgeability (chosen message security)

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- Extended to a multi-signature scheme [BN'06]

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- General aggregation: signatures can be created independently and then aggregated in arbitrary order

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- Extended to a sequential aggregate scheme [LOSSW'06]

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- For user i verification key is $X_i := e(g,g)^{xi}$, and $u^i_0,u^i_1,....,u^i_k$. Signing key is x_i and $y^i_0,y^i_1,..,y^i_k$ where $u^i_j = g^{yij}$

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  - ReRand(R,S) = (R*,S*), where $R^* = Rg^t$ and $S^* = S.h_1^t..h_i^t$

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    - Aggregate signatures saves on bandwidth and verification time, but does not allow un-aggregating the signatures

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- Similarly for pairing equations, but with further optimizations
  - e.g. Waters' signature: $e(S,g)=e(R,h).X$ (g same for all signers)
    - Can save using $\Pi_i e(S_i,g)^{w_i} = \Pi_i e(S_i^{w_i},g) = e(\Pi_i S_i^{w_i},g)$

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  - But a group manager can "trace" the signer
  - However, the group manager or other group members "cannot frame" a member

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  - Implies unforgeability (i.e., with no group members colluding with it, adversary cannot produce a valid signature) and framing-resistance (even colluding with the group manager)

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- Tracing algorithm decrypts C to find Key_i and hence ID_i

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- Extended to a ring signature [RST'01]

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- Unwitting collaborators: F_i's could be the verification keys for a standard signature scheme

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  - Security requirements: Unforgeability and Hiding

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- c.f. Mesh signatures: here, instead of multiple parties signing a message, a single party with multiple attributes

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- Using conventional tools. More efficiently using bilinear pairings.

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- Note: Still allows multiple (mutually distrusting) verifiers to be convinced if they run a secure MPC protocol to implement a virtual verifier

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  - e.g. a ring signature with a ring of size 2, containing the signer and the designated verifier

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