# **Integrity Policies**

## CS461/ECE422 – Computer Security I Fall 2009

# Reading

• CS: Chapter 6

### Overview

- Requirements
  - Very different than confidentiality policies
- Biba's models
  - Low-Water-Mark policy
  - Ring policy
  - Strict Integrity policy
- Lipner's model
  - Combines Bell-LaPadula, Biba
- Clark-Wilson model

## Requirements of Integrity Policies

- 1. Users will not write their own programs, but will use existing production programs and databases.
- 2. Programmers will develop and test programs on a non-production system; if they need access to actual data, they will be given production data via a special process, but will use it on their development system.
- 3. A special process must be followed to install a program from the development system onto the production system.
- 4. The special process in requirement 3 must be controlled and audited.
- 5. The managers and auditors must have access to both the system state and the system logs that are generated.

# Biba Integrity Model

#### Basis for all 3 models:


- Set of subjects S, objects O, integrity levels I, relation  $\leq \subseteq I \times I$  holding when second dominates first
- $min: I \times I \rightarrow I$  returns lesser of integrity levels
- $i: S \cup O \rightarrow I$  gives integrity level of entity
- $\underline{\mathbf{r}} \subseteq S \times O$  means  $s \in S$  can read  $o \in O$
- $\underline{w}$ ,  $\underline{x}$  defined similarly

# Intuition for Integrity Levels

- The higher the level, the more confidence
  - That a program will execute correctly
  - That data is accurate and/or reliable
- Note relationship between integrity and trustworthiness
- Important point: integrity levels are **not** security levels

## Information Transfer Path

- An *information transfer path* is a sequence of objects  $o_1$ , ...,  $o_{n+1}$  and corresponding sequence of subjects  $s_1$ , ...,  $s_n$  such that  $s_i \underline{r} o_i$  and  $s_i \underline{w} o_{i+1}$  for all i,  $1 \le i \le n$ .
- Idea: information can flow from  $o_1$  to  $o_{n+1}$  along this path by successive reads and writes



## Low-Water-Mark Policy

- Idea: when s reads o, i(s) = min(i(s), i (o)); s can only write objects at lower levels
- Rules
  - *s* ∈ *S* can write to o ∈ O if and only if i(o) ≤ i(s).
  - If  $s \in S$  reads  $o \in O$ , then i'(s) = min(i(s), i(o)), where i'(s) is the subject's integrity level after the read.
  - $s_1$  ∈ S can execute  $s_2$  ∈ S if and only if  $i(s_2) \le i(s_1)$ .

## Information Flow and Model

• If there is information transfer path from  $o_1$   $\in O$  to  $o_{n+1} \in O$ , enforcement of low-watermark policy requires  $i(o_{n+1}) \le i(o_1)$  for all n



### **Problems**

- Subjects' integrity levels decrease as system runs
  - Soon no subject will be able to access objects at high integrity levels
- Alternative: change object levels rather than subject levels
  - Soon all objects will be at the lowest integrity level
- Crux of problem is model prevents indirect modification
  - Because subject levels lowered when subject reads from low-integrity object

# Ring Policy

- Idea: subject integrity levels static
- Rules
  - *s* ∈ *S* can write to o ∈ O if and only if i(o) ≤ i(s).
  - Any subject can read any object.
  - $s_1$  ∈ S can execute  $s_2$  ∈ S if and only if  $i(s_2) \le i(s_1)$ .
- Eliminates indirect modification problem
- Same information flow result holds

# Strict Integrity Policy

- Dual of Bell-LaPadula model
  - s ∈ S can read o ∈ O iff i(s) ≤ i(o)
  - s ∈ S can write to o ∈ O iff i(o) ≤ i(s)
  - $s_1 \in S$  can execute  $s_2 \in O$  iff  $i(s_2) \le i(s_1)$
- Add compartments and discretionary controls to get full dual of Bell-LaPadula model
- Information flow result holds
  - Different proof, though
- Term "Biba Model" refers to this

## **Execute Clarification**

- What is the label of the new process created as result of executing a file?
  - In a real implementation would probably have mechanisms for choosing label of invoking process, label of executable, or some combination.
    - see Trusted OS slides
  - Labeling new files has similar points of confusion
- For the base case, assume new process inherit integrity label of invoking process
  - This would be the minimum of the two labels

### LOCUS and Biba

- Goal: prevent untrusted software from altering data or other software
- Approach: make levels of trust explicit
  - *credibility rating* based on estimate of software's trustworthiness (0 untrusted, *n* highly trusted)
  - trusted file systems contain software with a single credibility level
  - Process has *risk level* or highest credibility level at which process can execute
  - Must use run-untrusted command to run software at lower credibility level

# Integrity Matrix Model

- Lipner proposed this as first realistic commercial model
- Combines Bell-LaPadula, Biba models to obtain model conforming to requirements
- Do it in two steps
  - Bell-LaPadula component first
  - Add in Biba component

### Bell-LaPadula Clearances

- 2 security clearances/classifications
  - AM (Audit Manager): system audit, management functions
  - SL (System Low): any process can read at this level

# Bell-LaPadula Categories

#### • 5 categories

- D (Development): production programs in development but not yet in use
- PC (Production Code): production processes, programs
- PD (Production Data): data covered by integrity policy
- SD (System Development): system programs in development but not yet in use
- T (Software Tools): programs on production system not related to protected data

# Users and Security Levels

Subjects	Security Level
Ordinary users	(SL, { PC, PD })
Application developers	(SL, { D, T })
System programmers	(SL, { SD, T })
System managers and auditors	(AM, { D, PC, PD, SD, T })
System controllers	(SL, {D, PC, PD, SD, T}) and downgrade privilege
	Slide #6-18

# Objects and Classifications

Objects	Security Level
Development code/test data	(SL, { D, T })
Production code	(SL, { PC })
Production data	(SL, { PC, PD })
Software tools	(SL, { T })
System programs	$(SL, \emptyset)$
System programs in modification	(SL, { SD, T })
System and application logs	(AM, { appropriate })

## **Ideas**

- Ordinary users can execute (read) production code but cannot alter it
- Ordinary users can alter and read production data
- System managers need access to all logs but cannot change levels of objects
- System controllers need to install code (hence downgrade capability)
- Logs are append only, so must dominate subjects writing them

# Check Requirements

- 1. Users have no access to T, so cannot write their own programs
- 2. Applications programmers have no access to PD, so cannot access production data; if needed, it must be put into D, requiring the system controller to intervene
- 3. Installing a program requires downgrade procedure (from D to PC), so only system controllers can do it

## More Requirements

- 4. Control: only system controllers can downgrade; audit: any such downgrading must be altered
- System management and audit users are in AM and so have access to system state and logs

### **Problem**

- Too inflexible
  - An application developer cannot run a program for repairing inconsistent or erroneous production database
    - Application programmers are not given access to production data
- So add more ...

# Adding Biba

- 3 integrity classifications
  - ISP (System Program): for system programs
  - IO (Operational): production programs, development software
  - ISL (System Low): users get this on log in
- 2 integrity categories
  - ID (Development): development entities
  - IP (Production): production entities

## Simplify Bell-LaPadula

- Reduce security categories to 3:
  - SP (Production): production code, data
  - SD (Development): same as D
  - SSD (System Development): same as old SD

## Users and Levels

Subjects	Security Level	Integrity Level
Ordinary users	(SL, { SP })	(ISL, { IP })
Application developers	(SL, { SD })	(ISL, { ID })
System programmers	(SL, { SSD })	(ISL, { ID })
System managers and auditors	(AM, { SP, SD, SSD })	$(ISL, \emptyset)$
System controllers	(SL, { SP, SD, SSD }) and downgrade privilege	(ISP, { IP, ID})
Repair	(SL, { SP })	(ISL, { IP })

# Objects and Classifications

Objects	Security Level	Integrity Level
Development code/test data	(SL, { SD })	(ISL, { ID } )
Production code	(SL, { SP })	(IO, { IP })
Production data	(SL, { SP })	(ISL, { IP })
Software tools	$(SL, \emptyset)$	(IO, { ID })
System programs	$(SL, \emptyset)$	(ISP, { IP, ID })
System programs in modification	(SL, { SSD })	(ISL, { ID })
System and application logs	(AM, { appropriate })	$(ISL, \emptyset)$
Repair	(SL, {SP})	(ISL, { IP })

## **Ideas**

- Security clearances of subjects same as without integrity levels
- Ordinary users need to modify production data, so ordinary users must have write access to integrity category IP
- Ordinary users must be able to write production data but not production code; integrity classes allow this
  - Note writing constraints removed from security classes


# Clark-Wilson Integrity Model

- Integrity defined by a set of constraints
  - Data in a *consistent* or valid state when it satisfies these
- Example: Bank
  - D today's deposits, W withdrawals, YB yesterday's balance, TB today's balance
  - Integrity constraint: TB = D + YB W
- *Well-formed transaction* move system from one consistent state to another
- Issue: who examines, certifies transactions done correctly?


## **Entities**

- CDIs: constrained data items
  - Data subject to integrity controls
- UDIs: unconstrained data items
  - Data not subject to integrity controls
- IVPs: integrity verification procedures
  - Procedures that test the CDIs conform to the integrity constraints
- TPs: transaction procedures
  - Procedures that take the system from one valid state to another


## Certification Rule 1



## CR2 and ER1



## Other Rules



## Certification Rules 1 and 2

- CR1 When any IVP is run, it must ensure all CDIs are in a valid state
- CR2 For some associated set of CDIs, a TP must transform those CDIs in a valid state into a (possibly different) valid state
  - Defines relation *certified* that associates a set of CDIs with a particular TP
  - Example: TP balance, CDIs accounts, in bank example

## Enforcement Rules 1 and 2

- ER1 The system must maintain the certified relations and must ensure that only TPs certified to run on a CDI manipulate that CDI.
- ER2 The system must associate a user with each TP and set of CDIs. The TP may access those CDIs on behalf of the associated user. The TP cannot access that CDI on behalf of a user not associated with that TP and CDI.
  - System must maintain, enforce certified relation
  - System must also restrict access based on user ID (allowed relation)

### Users and Rules


- CR3 The allowed relations must meet the requirements imposed by the principle of separation of duty.
- ER3 The system must authenticate each user attempting to execute a TP
  - Type of authentication undefined, and depends on the instantiation
  - Authentication *not* required before use of the system, but *is* required before manipulation of CDIs (requires using TPs)

# Logging

CR4 All TPs must append enough information to reconstruct the operation to an append-only CDI.

- This CDI is the log
- Auditor needs to be able to determine what happened during reviews of transactions


## CR5 – Handling Untrusted Input



# Handling Untrusted Input

- CR5 Any TP that takes as input a UDI may perform only valid transformations, or no transformations, for all possible values of the UDI. The transformation either rejects the UDI or transforms it into a CDI.
  - In bank, numbers entered at keyboard are UDIs, so cannot be input to TPs. TPs must validate numbers (to make them a CDI) before using them; if validation fails, TP rejects UDI

#### ER4



User1 intersect User2 = empty set

## Separation of Duty In Model

- ER4 Only the certifier of a TP may change the list of entities associated with that TP. No certifier of a TP, or of an entity associated with that TP, may ever have execute permission with respect to that entity.
  - Enforces separation of duty with respect to certified and allowed relations

### Comparison With Requirements

- 1. Users can't certify TPs, so CR5 and ER4 enforce this
- Procedural, so model doesn't directly cover it; but special process corresponds to using TP
  - No technical controls can prevent programmer from developing program on production system; usual control is to delete software tools
- 3. TP does the installation, trusted personnel do certification

## Comparison With Requirements

- 1. CR4 provides logging; ER3 authenticates trusted personnel doing installation; CR5, ER4 control installation procedure
  - New program UDI before certification, CDI (and TP) after
- 2. Log is CDI, so appropriate TP can provide managers, auditors access
  - Access to state handled similarly

## Comparison to Biba

#### • Biba

- No notion of certification rules; trusted subjects ensure actions obey rules
- Untrusted data examined before being made trusted

#### Clark-Wilson

- Explicit requirements that *actions* must meet
- Trusted entity must certify *method* to upgrade untrusted data (and not certify the data itself)

### **UNIX** Implementation


 Considered "allowed" relation (user, TP, { CDI set })

- Each TP is owned by a different user
  - These "users" are actually locked accounts, so no real users can log into them; but this provides each TP a unique UID for controlling access rights
  - TP is setuid to that user
- Each TP's group contains set of users authorized to execute TP
- Each TP is executable by group, not by world

#### CDI Arrangement

- CDIs owned by *root* or some other unique user
  - Again, no logins to that user's account allowed
- CDI's group contains users of TPs allowed to manipulate CDI
- Now each TP can manipulate CDIs for single user

#### Basic Example



(U1, TP1, {CDI1, CDI2}) allowed (U5, TP2, {CDI1}) not allowed


### Examples

- Access to CDI constrained by user
  - − In "allowed" triple, *TP* can be any TP
  - Put CDIs in a group containing all users authorized to modify CDI
- Access to CDI constrained by TP
  - In "allowed" triple, user can be any user
  - CDIs allow access to the owner, the user owning the TP
  - Make the TP world executable

#### **Problem**


- 2 different users cannot use same copy of TP to access 2 different CDIs
  - Allow (U1, TP, {CDI1})
  - Allow (U2, TP, {CDI2})
  - Do not allow (U1, TP, {CDI2})

#### Problem Illustrated



#### Solution

Use 2 separate copies of TP1 (one for each user and CDI set)



#### Other Problems

- TPs are setuid programs
  - As these change privileges, want to minimize their number
- root can assume identity of users owning TPs, and so cannot be separated from certifiers
  - No way to overcome this without changing nature of root

#### **Key Points**

- Integrity policies deal with trust
  - As trust is hard to quantify, these policies are hard to evaluate completely
  - Look for assumptions and trusted users to find possible weak points in their implementation
- Biba, Lipner based on multilevel integrity
- Clark-Wilson focuses on separation of duty and transactions